Wikileaks Egitto: il Movimento Giovanile 6 Aprile e lo sciopero generale del 2008
Lo sciopero generale dei lavoratori egiziani ebbe luogo il 6 aprile 2008 ed ebbe come epicentro al-Mahalla al-Kubra, una città del Delta del Nilo, polo dell’industria tessile egiziana.
Lo sciopero, che fu represso in quelle maniere che abbiamo imparato a conoscere in questi giorni, agglutinò attorno a sé una protesta variegata.
Protagonisti, oltre agli operai (che chiedevano prima di tutto “pane”), furono il sindacato degli avvocati e un folto gruppo di giovani attivisti, da cui nacque il Movimento Giovanile 6 Aprile (in cui, come abbiamo visto, l’amministrazione americana, a torto, non credeva molto).
Oggi ho fatto un giro su Wikileaks e ho trovato questo cablo del 16 aprile 2008 che è molto interessante in vari sensi:
- ci racconta di quella rivolta e del backround a questa;
- ci racconta il livello molto alto di comunicazione fra autorità egiziane e amministrazione americana (Omar Suleiman è un personaggio chiave in questo senso, vedi il mio prossimo post, sempre che riesca a farlo);
- sappiamo che le modalità organizzative (FB etc.) delle dimostrazioni erano ben note sia agli americani che agli egiziani (fra l’altro vi si parla del fatto che gli attivisti avevano organizzato un’altra protesta per 4 maggio 2008, 80° compleanno di Mubarak, il ché ci racconta da quanto tempo la “questione Mubarak” fosse considerata centrale);
- traccia una storia dei tumulti e delle rivolte egiziane in visione comparativa per giungere alla constatazione che “anche la supposta quiescenza degli Egiziani ha un limite”. Neretto mio:
1952's "Black Saturday," when many foreign-affiliated establishments in Cairo were burned to the ground; the January 1977 bread riots, when tens of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets nationwide in anti-government riots precipitated by the government's planned cancellation of food subsidies; and the February 1986 riots of the Central Security Forces, protesting a rumored extension of their term of service, resulting in hundreds of deaths nationwide, and USD millions in damage, all demonstrate that even supposedly quiescent Egyptians have their limits.
Sul “Movimento 6 aprile” c’è anche questo lunghissimo pezzo del NYT del 22 gennaio 2009 (il ché ci dimostra quanto spesso Wikieaks funzioni da “memo” più che da “rivelatore di segreti”).
Segue il cablo per intero:
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
08CAIRO783 | 2008-04-16 10:10 | 2011-02-01 15:03 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo |
Appears in these articles: http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=1147120 |
VZCZCXRO9526 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHEG #0783/01 1071041 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 161041Z APR 08 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8946 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000783 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR PASCUAL E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM EG SUBJECT: MAHALLA RIOTS: ISOLATED INCIDENT OR TIP OF AN ICEBERG? REF: A. CAIRO 621 ¶B. CAIRO 697 ¶C. CAIRO 715 ¶D. CAIRO 724 ¶E. CAIRO 730 Classified By: DCM Stuart E. Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Egyptians are uneasy about the April 6 and 7 anti-government riots in Mahalla, which featured thousands of unemployed youth battling riot police in the streets of the Nile Delta mill-town (refs B-D). The violent demonstrations followed on an opposition-organized general strike on April 6, which noticeably quieted Cairo's busy streets, as many Egyptians stayed home, many out of fear of potential public disorder, and some in solidarity with the strike (ref B). The Mahalla riots have both reflected and fed into resentment about spiraling food prices and widespread anger at the government. Egyptians are in a sour mood, and their frustration seems more vocal than just a few months ago. The government is paying close attention, and is now focused on heading off a follow-on national strike called for May 4, Mubarak's eightieth birthday. End summary. -------------------- HEROES OR HOOLIGANS? -------------------- ¶2. (C) Reaction to the Mahalla clashes seems divided along class lines. The lower-income Egyptians we spoke with expressed enthusiasm about the riots, with two independently telling us they were "ecstatic" at the news. Many said, "the government deserved it." They all attributed the riots to sharply increased food prices. Year-on-year inflation in March reached 14.4 percent; food-only inflation for March reached 22 percent. Many Egyptians acknowledge that the fundamental unspoken Egyptians social pact -- the peoples' obeisance in exchange for a modest but government-guaranteed standard of living -- is under stress, and the poor feel this most acutely. One worker remarked: "it is the people's right (to strike), if their government lies to them, tells them that food prices are stable, but then we go try to buy oil or bread, and cannot afford it." A cab driver told us, "God willing, such riots will occur in Cairo soon; the only thing stopping us is fear." ¶3. (C) Elites appear anxious. On April 6, many parents of private school children kept their children home. The private German School was reportedly half empty. Referring to Mahalla, a textile factory owner told us, "The poor are desperate, and this is a natural result of that. We may see more riots, and we will definitely see more crime in Cairo; it is already happening; the poor have to resort to stealing." Meanwhile, Cairo's limited middle class seems stuck in between - a reflexive fear of chaos feeds their worries of riots, but seems nearly equaled by their admiration of the Mahalla protesters for "giving the government what it deserves," as one shop-owner told us. ------------------------------- IS THIS THE START OF SOMETHING? ------------------------------- ¶4. (C) The key question is, will the localized incident in Mahalla spark a wider movement? The government is clearly focused on containing unrest. Even while the riots were still winding down, PM Nazif traveled to Mahalla, paid bonuses to factory workers and praised those who did not join in the riots (ref D). The government has also accelerated arrests of activists in Cairo (ref E). The organizers of the April 6 strike -- distinct from Mahalla -- have already called, via Facebook, for a follow-on national strike on May 4, Mubarak's eightieth birthday. Even regime insiders have acknowledged the political savvy behind this tactic -- channeling current outrage towards the next big event. The GOE responded with a press release announcing that President Mubarak will give a May 5 speech to "underline Egypt's keen to desire to protect the rights of laborers and accentuate the role they can play in the development process .... and to reiterate the government's commitment to safeguard the interests of workers against any backlashes they might face as a result of the economic reform program." More broadly, the government continues to address the shortage of subsidized bread by using military bakeries and distribution centers, and bread lines in Cairo seem to have diminished. ¶5. (C) The government's concern is driven by recent events, but likely also by worried looks in the rear-view mirror. Egyptians are renowned for their apathy in the face of trying CAIRO 00000783 002 OF 002 conditions. Nevertheless, 1952's "Black Saturday," when many foreign-affiliated establishments in Cairo were burned to the ground; the January 1977 bread riots, when tens of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets nationwide in anti-government riots precipitated by the government's planned cancellation of food subsidies; and the February 1986 riots of the Central Security Forces, protesting a rumored extension of their term of service, resulting in hundreds of deaths nationwide, and USD millions in damage, all demonstrate that even supposedly quiescent Egyptians have their limits. ¶6. (C) While there are currently no angry demonstrators on the streets of Cairo, the situation is more tense than even a few months ago. Widespread bitterness about spiraling prices, seething upset about government corruption, disdain for the Mubarak government's perceived pro-US and Israel posture, and working class economic woes (ref A) bubble up in virtually every conversation. It is not clear how the next catalyst for action -- if there is one -- might materialize. Neither the Mahalla rioters nor the April 6 group have charismatic, clearly identified leadership. It is significant that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), now suffering under the arrests of thousands of arrests of its members, distanced itself from both of "movements." Egypt's omnipresent security apparatus is also a strong counter-balance to riots and demonstrations. We think it is possible that Egypt will witness further spasms of limited violence, but these are likely to be isolated and uncoordinated, rather than revolutionary in nature. ¶7. (C) Although not on the scale of the 1977 or 1986 riots, Mahalla is significant. The violent protests demonstrated that it is possible to tear down a poster of Mubarak and stomp on it, to shout obscene anti-regime slogans, to burn a minibus and hurl rocks at riot police. These are unfamiliar images that lower-income Egyptians thrill to. In Mahalla, a new organic opposition force bubbled to the surface, defying current political labels, and apparently not affiliated with the MB. This may require the government to change its script. ¶8. (C) April 6 brought together disparate opposition forces together with numerous non-activist Egyptians, with the Facebook calls for a strike attracting 70,000 people on-line, and garnering widespread national attention. The nexus of the upper and middle-class Facebook users, and their poorer counterparts in the factories of Mahalla, created a new dynamic. One senior insider mused, "Who could have imagined that a few kids on the internet could foment a buzz that the entire country noticed? I wish we could do that in the National Democratic Party." ¶9. (C) Another result of Mahalla is that Mubarak will even more strongly resist both economic and political reform initiatives. Six months ago, economic cabinet ministers openly discussed phasing out food and fuel subsidies in favor of transfer payments to the very poor. That initiative now seems to be off the table. We are also hearing that unrest over prices has strengthened the security ministers in the cabinet in resisting privatization and other efforts towards liberalization. The riots introduce a new dynamic for us as well. Under these stressful conditions, Mubarak and his regime will be even more sensitive to US criticism over human rights abuses and democracy shortfalls. On April 15, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit, meeting with the Ambassador, cited the Mahalla incident as a strain and added that he hoped that the United States would be supportive of Egypt during this difficult period. RICCIARDONEhttps://in30secondi.altervista.org/2011/02/08/wikileaks-il-movimento-giovanile-6-aprile-e-lo-sciopero-generale-del-2008/In fiamme1977 rivolta del pane,1986 rivolta della polizia,2011.01.25,2011.04.06,black saturday 1952,egitto,hosni mubarak,movimento giovanile 6 aprile
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